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NOTE
Twenty-Nine Photographs and the
Deterioration of
the Missouri Relevance Rule
State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
Luke A. Hawley*

I. INTRODUCTION
Courts generally prohibit the admission of unfairly prejudicial
evidence.1 The idea is that jurors should not be shown evidence if it has a
substantially greater likelihood of prejudicing the jurors against the defendant
than it does of helping them determine the facts of the case.2 Barring
objections on other evidentiary grounds, if a piece of evidence provides
substantially more probative than prejudicial value, the evidence can be
shown to the jury.3
For decades, Missouri courts have limited the admissibility of unfairly
prejudicial evidence.4 While federal courts are governed by the Federal Rules
of Evidence, Missouri is one of the few states that does not have an evidence
code or stated rules of evidence.5 Instead, evidence in Missouri courts is
governed by a loose body of case precedent and state statutes.6 Regarding
prejudicial evidence in particular, Missouri courts are guided solely by case
precedent.7 Missouri judges are given great latitude in determining whether
evidence should be excluded based on its prejudicial nature.8 Abuse of that
discretion can expose jurors to unfairly prejudicial testimony which may skew
their perceptions of the defendant.
*

B.S., Political Science, University of Central Missouri, 2018; J.D. Candidate,
University of Missouri School of Law, 2021. I would like to thank Professor Bowman
for his insight during the writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for
its help in the editing process.
1. Mo. Evid. Restated § 403 (Mo. Bar 5th ed. 2015).
2. FED. R. EVID. 403.
3. Id.
4. Mo. Evid. Restated § 403 (Mo. Bar 5th ed. 2015).
5. Id. at § 102.
6. Id.
7. Id. at § 403.
8. Id.
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In State v. Wood, the Supreme Court of Missouri conducted an abuse of
discretion review of the trial court’s decision to allow into evidence
photographs of firearms that were not used in the commission of the murder.9
The majority held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by
overruling the defendant’s objection to the firearm evidence.10 Judge Stith
provided the sole dissent, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing testimony and twenty-nine photos of guns that were unrelated to the
charged crime.11 First, this Note argues that the majority’s opinion went
against the great weight of Missouri precedent. Next, this Note argues that
the dissenting opinion more accurately portrays the state of prejudice law in
Missouri. Finally, this Note posits that the integrity of the criminal justice
system is undermined by the result of Wood.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On February 18, 2014, Craig Wood killed ten-year-old Hailey Owens.12
Owens was walking down a sidewalk near her home in Springfield, Missouri,
when Wood pulled alongside her in a tan Ford Ranger pickup truck.13 Wood
asked Owens for directions, but Owens kept walking.14 Wood opened the
door and told Owens to come back.15 When Owens stepped back toward the
truck, Wood pulled her into the truck and drove away.16 Two witnesses saw
the incident, noted Wood’s license plate number, and called the police.17
Police ran the license plate number and determined that the truck belonged to
Wood’s parents with Wood being the primary driver.18
That evening, Springfield police officers conducted surveillance of
Wood’s home and observed a tan Ford Ranger pickup truck pull into the
driveway at 8:30 p.m.19 The truck matched the license plate number that the
witnesses had reported and officers approached.20 Wood exited the truck and
tossed a roll of duct tape into the bed of the truck.21 Wood smelled like bleach
and, when asked, acknowledged that he knew why the officers were there.22

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 575–76 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
Id. at 577 (majority opinion).
Id. at 591 (Stith, J., dissenting).
Id. at 571–573 (majority opinion).
Id. at 571.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Wood complied with the officers and voluntarily went to the police
station.23 Wood admitted that the tan Ford Ranger pickup truck was his, but
Wood did not answer questions pertaining to Owens’s whereabouts.24
Officers examined Wood and noted cuts on his lower lip and fingers, as well
as marks near his neck and groin.25 Wood’s hat had been stained by bleach,
and he stated he had purchased bleach and drain cleaner from the store that
day.26 Wood also stated that he had dropped laundry off at the laundromat
earlier in the day.27
Before obtaining a warrant, officers went to Wood’s home and looked
for Owens, entering through an unlocked door.28 They noted a strong odor of
bleach coming from the basement.29 The floor and steps were wet, and there
was also a scrap of duct-tape on the floor.30 There were bottles of bleach and
plastic storage tubs.31 Unable to find Owens, officers left Wood’s home.32
Later that evening, officers obtained a search warrant and returned to
Wood’s home to conduct a more thorough search.33 In Wood’s bedroom, the
officers found that his bed had been stripped of sheets and blankets.34 On
Wood’s dresser, officers found a folder with handwritten fantasy stories of
sexual encounters between an adult male and thirteen-year-old girls.35 The
folder also contained photographs of female students at the middle school
where Wood worked.36
In the basement of Wood’s home, officers found Owens’s body wrapped
in plastic bags and stuffed into a large plastic storage tub.37 Owens was naked,
stiffened from rigor mortis, wet, and smelled of bleach.38 Owens had bruises
and marks indicating that she had been tied by the wrists and attempted to free
herself.39 Marks on Owens’s body also indicated that she had been sexually
assaulted.40

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 571–72.
Id. at 572.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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An autopsy showed that Owens died from a single gunshot to the back
of her neck.41 Forensic analysis revealed that the wound came from a .22
caliber bullet, passing through the base of Owens’s brain.42 The autopsy also
showed that the killer had fired from point-blank range, placing the barrel of
the gun on the back of Owens’s neck and pulling the trigger.43 Officers found
a .22 caliber shell casing laying on the basement floor and concluded that the
shell casing was fired from a .22 caliber Ruger 10/22 rifle that was locked in
a gun safe in Wood’s storage room.44 In addition to the murder weapon found
in the gun safe, officers also found several larger guns and gun accessories
throughout the home.45 In Wood’s bedroom, officers found a shotgun leaning
against the wall and a larger caliber handgun on the nightstand next to the
bed.46
The prosecutor charged Wood with one count of first-degree murder,
one count of armed criminal action, one count of child kidnapping, one count
of rape, and one count of sodomy.47 However, the state proceeded to trial
only on the murder count.48
During the guilt phase of the trial, Wood did not testify or present
evidence.49 During his opening statement, Wood’s counsel argued that Wood
did not deliberate before killing Owens.50 In response, the State’s closing
argument emphasized the evidence that could lead the jury to believe Wood
did, in fact, deliberate before killing Owens.51 The prosecutor stated, “I
submit to you that when you place the muzzle, the end of the barrel of a gun,
against the back of the base of the skull and you pull the trigger, there’s only
one purpose you have, and that’s to kill someone. Your common sense tells
you that.”52
During the guilt phase of the trial, the State called Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”) Agent Tucker to detail the firearms that law
enforcement found in Wood’s home.53 Agent Tucker testified that Wood had
a holstered .44 caliber pistol on the dining room table, a .45 caliber pistol on
a nearby bookshelf, a .38 caliber revolver on a bookshelf, a gun case with two

41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Brief for Appellant at 22, State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566 (Mo. 2019) (No.
96924).
48. Id. The record is not clear as to why the State chose to proceed on only this
charge.
49. Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 572.
50. Id.
51. Id.; See MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (requiring deliberation before the killing
in order for it meet the requirements of first-degree murder).
52. Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 572.
53. Id. at 592 (Stith, J., dissenting).
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semiautomatic handguns, a pump action shotgun in the bedroom, a .40 caliber
semiautomatic in the bedroom, a revolver in the storage room, a gun safe
containing ten additional guns, and another pump action shotgun sitting
outside the gun safe.54 As Agent Tucker described each gun, the jury was
shown a photograph of the firearm.55 The State also asked Agent Tucker to
describe his experiences finding weapon accessories such as Wood’s speed
reloader, gun cases, ammunition, and reloading supplies.56 The State showed
photos of these accessories to the jury as well.57 In total, the State published
twenty-nine photographs of different weapons and accessories to the jury over
Wood’s objection.58
The State argued that Wood’s deliberation was evidenced by his decision
to choose his smallest, quietest gun to commit the murder.59 The State
presented this evidence in conjunction with the fact that Wood attempted to
hide his crime by changing his sheets, bleaching and hiding Owens’s body,
and disposing of Owens’s clothes as proof that he deliberately killed Owens.60
After hearing this evidence, the jury convicted Wood of first-degree murder.61
During the penalty phase of the trial, the State elicited testimony that
there was no prior connection between Wood and Owens or her family.62 The
State called a computer forensic examiner, who testified that after an Amber
Alert was issued that listed Wood’s truck, one friend sent Wood a text
message asking, “You haven’t been hunting, have you.”63 A second friend
sent Wood a text message that said, “Oh great, I just got an Amber Alert for
a gold Ford Ranger. What have you and [your dog] done???”64
During the penalty phase of the trial, Wood presented evidence from his
parents, his friends, guards from the Greene County Jail, and a priest.65
Wood’s parents testified about Wood’s battle with depression and substance
abuse, but also noted that he was employed and did not have a significant
criminal history.66 Wood’s friends testified that they were surprised by
Wood’s arrest because this type of crime was inconsistent with his normal
character.67 One friend even recounted a story of Wood saving a man’s life
in an apartment fire.68 Wood’s friends testified that they did not know Wood
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; Brief for Appellant, supra note 47, at 53.
Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 572 (majority opinion).
Id. at 572–73.
Id. at 573.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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had sexual fantasies about teenage girls.69 The priest testified that after
Wood’s arrest, Wood renewed his faith, studied the Bible, and regularly met
with the priest to discuss his crime.70 Additionally, the jail guards testified
that Wood caused no problems in the jail besides one instance where he
hoarded pills apparently for the purpose of attempting suicide.71
The jury unanimously found several statutory aggravating
circumstances, including that the murder of Owens involved torture and
depravity, exhibited a callous disregard for the sanctity of human life, was
committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest, was committed against a
potential witness in the investigation against Wood, and was committed while
Wood engaged in rape, sodomy, and kidnapping.72 The jury did not determine
that the mitigating circumstances outweighed these aggravating
circumstances and subsequently could not agree as to whether Wood should
receive the death penalty.73 Because the jury was not able to unanimously
decide Wood’s punishment, the circuit court decided Wood’s sentence
pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute Section 565.030.74 The circuit court
held that the aggravating circumstances were found by the jury and
determined that the mitigating factors were outweighed by the aggravating
circumstances.75 Subsequently, the circuit court ruled that Wood should be
sentenced to death.76
Wood presented nine different points on appeal, challenging several of
the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings, the State’s closing argument, the
decision to strike a juror for cause, and the constitutional validity of
Missouri’s death penalty procedures that allowed the judge to sentence Wood
to death without a unanimous finding by a jury.77
This Note focuses on only one of Wood’s points on appeal: that the
circuit court abused its discretion by admitting photographs and testimony
concerning firearms that were not used in the commission of the crime.78
During the guilt phase of the trial, the State was allowed to present, over
Wood’s objection, twenty-nine photographs of guns and other accessories that
were found in Wood’s home.79 The photographs showed that Wood had at
least twenty guns of various types and sizes scattered throughout his home.80

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 573–574; see MO. REV. STAT. § 565.032 (2018).
73. Brief for Appellant, supra note 47, at 28.
74. Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 574; see MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2018)
(explaining the procedure for shifting death penalty sentencing to judges when juries
are unable to reach decisions).
75. Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 574.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Brief for Appellant, supra note 47, at 53.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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The photographs also showed boxes of ammunition, gun cases, a speed
reloader, and a reloading station.81 Wood objected to the photographs being
logically irrelevant and prejudicial because the only purpose the State could
have for admitting the photographs was to show that Wood is a “gun-crazed,”
dangerous person with a propensity for violence.82 Wood argued on appeal
that the testimony and evidence was so excessive and had such little probative
value that it should have been excluded.83 Wood argued that by allowing this
evidence, the circuit court violated Wood’s right to due process, a fair trial,
and a fair and reliable sentencing proceeding, thereby warranting reversal.84
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the circuit court had not abused
its discretion in overruling Wood’s objections to the evidence of firearms,
ammunition, and related items that were found in Wood’s home.85

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
While the underlying principles for the evidentiary rules of relevance
and prejudice are largely consistent among jurisdictions, the specific
mechanism for the underlying rules may vary. First, this Part discusses the
Federal Rules of Evidence and their prohibition against irrelevant and overly
prejudicial evidence. Next, this Part introduces Missouri case law and
highlights Missouri state courts’ treatment of relevance and prejudice.

A. Federal Treatment of Relevance and Prejudice
The Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) restrict the trier of fact to
considering only evidence that is material in deciding the case.86 FRE 402
states that relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Acts of Congress, by the FRE, or by
other rules prescribed by the United States Supreme Court.87 FRE 402 also
states that “[i]rrelevant evidence is not admissible.”88 FRE 401 provides the
test for relevant evidence: “Evidence is relevant if (a) it has any tendency to
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”89 FRE 403 discusses
the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence for prejudice, confusion, waste
of time, or other reasons.90 FRE 403 provides that otherwise relevant evidence
81. Id.
82. Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 575–76.
83. Brief for Appellant, supra note 47, at 54.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 577.
86. FED. R. EVID. 402.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. FED. R. EVID. 401.
90. FED. R. EVID. 403. FRE 403 also excludes evidence for misleading the jury,
undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
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is not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect.91
One of the primary federal cases dealing with FRE 401, 402, and 403 is
Old Chief v. United States.92 In Old Chief, the defendant was charged with
violating a federal statute prohibiting the carrying of firearms by convicted
felons.93 The defendant attempted to stipulate that he had previously been
convicted of a previous felony, asking the judge to instruct the jury of the
defendant’s previous assault conviction rather than allow the state to present
such evidence.94 The trial court allowed evidence of the defendant’s prior
criminal conviction despite the defendant’s objection.95 The defendant
challenged the decision, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing evidence that has substantially more prejudicial value than it does
probative value.96 The Supreme Court discussed unfair prejudice as speaking
to “the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder
into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense
charged.”97 The Court also highlighted the Committee Notes on FRE 403,
stating that “[u]nfair prejudice within its context means an undue tendency to
suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one.”98 The Court went on to note that when considering if
evidence is more prejudicial than it is probative, the availability of other
means of proof can be a valuable consideration.99 The Supreme Court went
on to reverse the lower court’s decision, finding that the risk of unfair
prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the criminal
record.100
Even before the Supreme Court’s decision in Old Chief, federal courts
considered evidence of guns unrelated to the charged crime as unduly
prejudicial.101 In United States v. Robinson, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed Robinson’s conviction for bank
robbery based on the improper admission of evidence pertaining to a .38
caliber handgun found on Robinson’s person at the time of his arrest.102

91. FED. R. EVID. 403. The rule states that “[t]he court may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one of more
of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
92. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S 172 (1997).
93. Id. at 174–75.
94. Id. at 175.
95. Id. at 177.
96. Id. at 180.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 180 (internal quotations omitted); see FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory
committee’s notes.
99. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 180.
100. Id. at 178.
101. See United States v. Robinson, 544 F.2d 611 (2nd Cir. 1976).
102. Id. at 613.
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Robinson agreed that his firearm was relevant because FRE 401 would be
satisfied if the firearm had “any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence in the determination of the action more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.”103 However, Robinson argued that
evidence of his firearm lacked the necessary probative value to outweigh its
prejudicial effect pursuant to FRE 403.104 The Second Circuit reversed
Robinson’s conviction because Robinson’s firearm
[E]stablished only a very weak inference at best that appellant was one
of the bank robbers; it was likely to have had a significant prejudicial
impact on the minds of the jurors; and, in the circumstances of this
exceedingly close case, may be treated as sufficiently affecting the
verdict that its admission requires reversal.105

When analyzing the prejudicial value of the firearm, the court stated,
“[T]he length of the chain of inferences necessary to connect the evidence
with the ultimate fact to be proved necessarily lessens the probative value of
the evidence, and may therefore render it more susceptible to exclusion
as…prejudicial…”106
Both Old Chief and Robinson show how federal courts have treated the
exclusion of evidence that has prejudicial impact substantially outweighing
its probative value.107 While neither case is binding on the Supreme Court of
Missouri’s interpretation of prejudice, the analysis presented may be
persuasive in Missouri because the Supreme Court of Missouri has
historically treated federal court analysis of the FRE as persuasive when
interpreting Missouri’s own rules of evidence.108

B. Missouri Treatment of Relevance and Prejudice
Similar to the federal rule, the general rule in Missouri is that relevance
is a two-tier analysis requiring both logical and legal relevance.109 Like the
FRE, evidence is logically relevant if it “tends to make the existence of a
material fact more or less probable.”110 The Supreme Court of Missouri has
noted that “[l]egal relevance weighs the probative value of the evidence
against its costs – unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness.”111 If the costs of the
103. Id. at 615 (quoting United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1203–04 n. 9
(2nd Cir. 1970)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 616.
106. Id. (quoting Ravich, 421 F.2d at 1204 n. 10).
107. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 191–192; Robinson, 544 F.2d at 616.
108. See State v. Williams, 548 S.W.3d 275 (Mo. 2018) (en banc).
109. State v. Smith, 32 S.W.3d 532, 546 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
110. State v. Anderson, 76 S.W.3d 275, 276 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
111. Id.
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evidence outweigh its benefits, even logically relevant evidence is excluded
for lacking legal relevance.112 Generally, the greater the tendency of the
evidence to prove or disprove a material matter of the case, the more likely
that danger of prejudice will be outweighed and the evidence will be
admitted.113 Historically, Missouri courts have held that evidence of firearms
that were not used in the charged offense is inadmissible at trial as being
unfairly prejudicial.114
One of the first Missouri cases to speak to the relevance of unrelated
guns is State v. Wynne.115 In Wynne, the defendant shot the victim – her exhusband’s new wife – five times with a .25 caliber automatic pistol.116 Wynne
defended her actions on both self-defense and insanity grounds, also claiming
that she did not commit the murder and never possessed a gun.117 The
defendant’s daughter testified that her mother’s ex-husband (the victim’s
husband) carried a gun, and that gun was shown to the defendant on crossexamination, over objection.118 The Supreme Court of Missouri overturned
the conviction, articulating the general rule: “[W]eapons and objects not
connected with the defendant or the crime are not admissible unless they
possess some probative value.”119 The court went on to note that if the state
is going to attempt to use this type of weapon as demonstrative evidence, the
“evidence must meet the tests of relevancy, materiality, probative value and
reasons of policy in the administration of justice.”120
Another leading Missouri case addressing the lack of probative value of
guns unrelated to the charged crime is State v. Holbert.121 In Holbert, the
defendant was arrested for the possession of a handgun.122 At trial, the
prosecutor admitted evidence of two other guns in the defendant’s vehicle that
were not the subject of the arrest.123 The defendant objected to evidence of
the other two guns being irrelevant on the grounds that they tended to prove
other offenses, that they were not admissible to prove intent on the present
charge, and that they were inflammatory and offered only to create
prejudice.124 The court overruled the defendant’s objections, and the
defendant was convicted.125 The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the
112. Id.
113. Mo. Evid. Restated § 403 (Mo. Bar 5th ed. 2015).
114. See, e.g., State v. Charles, 572 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. App. W.D. 1978); State v.
Holbert, 416 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. 1967); State v. Wynne, 182 S.W.2d. 294 (1944).
115. Wynne, 182 S.W.2d. 294 (1944).
116. Id. at 295.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 298–99.
119. Id. at 299.
120. Id.
121. State v. Holbert, 416 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. 1967).
122. Id. at 130.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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guns that were unrelated to the charged offense had no legitimate probative
value in establishing defendant’s guilt, and that their use throughout trial was
prejudicial to the defendant.126
After Holbert, Missouri cases continued addressing the highly
prejudicial effects of introducing evidence of guns that are unrelated to the
charged crime in cases like State v. Charles.127 In Charles, the defendant was
charged with robbery and murder after he fatally shot a convenience store
clerk.128 At trial, the prosecutor cross-examined the defendant on whether he
had ever owned a handgun.129 When the defendant denied owning a handgun,
the prosecutor entered the gun that the defendant had allegedly owned but not
used in the alleged crime.130 The defendant was convicted, and the Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Western District overruled the trial court, holding
that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a gun that was unrelated to
the crime charged.131
Lethal weapons completely unrelated to and unconnected with the
criminal offense for which an accused is standing trial have a ring of
prejudice seldom attached to other demonstrative evidence, and the
appellate courts of this state have been quick to brand their admission
into evidence, and any display of or reference to them during closing
argument, as prejudicial error.132

The Supreme Court of Missouri again ruled on the admissibility of
firearms unrelated to the charged crime in State v. Hosier, and while the court
allowed evidence of the firearm, they did so only for a specific reason.133 In
Hosier, the defendant committed a murder and fled the scene.134 When police
officers stopped the defendant, they found fourteen firearms and ammunition
in his vehicle.135 When the prosecutor attempted to enter evidence of these
firearms at trial, the defendant objected to the evidence being substantially
more prejudicial than probative.136 The trial court allowed the evidence of the
unrelated firearms and the defendant was convicted.137 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Missouri held that the trial court did not err in allowing the
evidence because the guns that were found in the defendant’s vehicle during
his “direct flight” from the scene were relevant to show “consciousness of

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 133.
State v. Charles, 572 S.W.2d 193 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
Id. at 194–95.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 198.
State v. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
Id. at 888–89.
Id. at 890.
Id. at 895.
Id.
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guilt.”138 However, the court did reaffirm the principal that “weapons
unconnected with either the accused or the offense for which he is standing
trial lack any probative value and their admission into evidence [was]
inherently prejudicial.”139
These cases exemplify the rule that firearms unrelated to the charged
crime are unfairly prejudicial. Because the prejudicial impact of these
firearms outweighs their probative value, Missouri courts have traditionally
held them to be inadmissible.140

IV. INSTANT DECISION
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, Wood contended he was
improperly convicted and sentenced to death for a number of reasons, one
being the admittance of twenty-nine photographs of unrelated firearms into
evidence that substantially prejudiced the jury against him.141 Wood’s
primary argument was that, under State v. Hosier, evidence of weapons not
connected to the defendant or the offense in question are generally
inadmissible.142
Wood’s only defense during the guilt phase of the trial was that he lacked
the requisite deliberation.143 The court held that “evidence of firearms of
varying calibers and gauges found throughout Wood’s home shortly after he
killed [Owens] was logically and legally relevant to show deliberation
because it tended to prove Wood deliberately chose the smallest weapon from
his collection to facilitate his efforts to cover up the murder.”144 The court
also noted that, in addition to Wood passing up the other firearms in the home,
the evidence showed that Wood had guns sitting in plain view in the bedroom
where he raped Owens, thus somehow helping to establish deliberation.145
Because the prosecution framed the firearms as relevant to prove deliberation,
the Supreme Court of Missouri held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by overruling Wood’s objection to the evidence of the firearms,
ammunition, and related items found throughout the home.146
Judge Laura Denvir Stith dissented, disagreeing with the principal
opinion’s determination that it was not prejudicial error to allow the
138. Id. at 895–96.
139. Id. at 895 (citing State v. Grant, 810 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Mo. App. 1991)).
140. See generally State v. Charles, 572 S.W.2d 193, 199 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978);
State v. Holbert, 416 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. 1967); State v. Wynne, 182 S.W.2d 294 (Mo.
1944).
141. Brief for Appellant, supra note 47, at 54.
142. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d at 895–96.
143. State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 576 (Mo. 2019) (en banc); see MO. REV.
STAT. § 565.020 (2018) (emphasizing “deliberation” as an element of first-degree
murder).
144. Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 576.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 577.
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prosecution to introduce twenty-nine photographs of firearms that were not
used in the murder.147 Judge Stith analyzed decades of Missouri case law,
including cases like Wynne and Holbert, finding that Missouri courts have
consistently recognized that admitting evidence of weapons unconnected to
the charged offense inherently causes prejudice and subsequently constitutes
reverRsible error.148 While Judge Stith acknowledged that Wood’s killing of
Owens was horrific, her dissent noted that this case does “not justify the
jettisoning of decades of caselaw.”149
Judge Stith rejected the principal opinion’s argument that the twentynine photographs were relevant for the purposes of proving deliberation.150
Judge Stith noted that mere logical relevance is insufficient to establish
admissibility – the circuit court must also determine evidence’s legal
relevance by weighing its probative value against its unfair prejudice.151
Judge Stith’s argument was that the principal opinion erred in conducting this
balancing test.152
Judge Stith also argued that, if deliberation had truly been the issue, the
prosecutor could have simply elicited testimony that Wood possessed multiple
guns and chose the smallest of those guns to commit the crime, rather than
show the jury photos of each of these guns.153 If introducing photographic
evidence was so important, Judge Stith argued that the State could have
admitted a picture of one or two of Wood’s guns that he passed up on.154
Judge Stith went on to note that, instead of utilizing these other means of
proving deliberation, the circuit court allowed the photographs of these
firearms to become “the centerpiece of the trial,” going beyond what is
necessary to present relevant facts.155 Specifically, Judge Stith took issue with
the evidence presented by FBI Special Agent Tucker, who testified at length
about more than twenty firearms that were found in Wood’s home.156
Judge Stith posited that the circuit court and the majority opinion failed
to acknowledge the large breadth of Missouri case law dealing with
prejudicial evidence.157 Judge Stith stated simply:
The circuit court then had a duty to weigh the probative value of each
additional piece of gun evidence against the inherently prejudicial
nature of gun evidence. From the record, it appears the circuit court
skipped this step and simply admitted evidence en masse after finding

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 591 (Stith, J., dissenting).
Id. at 591–593.
Id. at 591.
Id.
Id. at 592; see State v. Anderson, 76 S.W.3d 275, 276 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 593 (Stith, J., dissenting).
Id. at 592.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 591–593.
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slight relevance without considering evidence as to a particular gun or
accessory to determine whether this additional evidence actually was
legally relevant, and how to limit its prejudicial impact. This was
error.158

Judge Stith also argued that the trial court’s error was not harmless.159
The jury in this case was deadlocked as to the punishment that the defendant
should receive.160 In Missouri, if a jury is deadlocked as to the punishment
that a defendant in a murder case should receive, the trial court itself can use
its discretion and determine the defendant’s sentence.161 Subsequently, Judge
Stith noted that, but for this prejudicial firearm evidence, the jury may have
deliberated differently and kept the determination out of the judge’s hands
altogether.162 For this reason, Judge Stith found that the introduction of
photographs of these unrelated weapons is prejudicial error warranting
reversal.163
The majority argued against Judge Stith’s dissent, asserting that the
dissenting opinion improperly relied on fundamentally distinguishable
cases.164 Essentially, the majority argued that because Judge Stith cited cases
where the actual firearms were admitted into evidence rather than photographs
like were admitted in this case, Judge Stith’s dissent misapplies the law.165
However, the majority cites no legal authority to support its discrediting the
foundation of Judge Stith’s argument.166 Additionally, the principal opinion
argued that the dissent “overlook[ed] the fact that the logical and legal
relevance was amplified by the number of weapons precisely because it
showed Wood deliberately chose the .22-caliber rifle even though multiple
other weapons were more readily accessible.”167 Lastly, the majority argued
that the dissenting opinion was incorrect because the prejudicial effect of the
firearms was minimized by the admittance of mere photographs rather than
the actual weapons.168

V. COMMENT
The precedent established by the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision
in Wood leaves criminal defendants susceptible to becoming victims to
wanton prejudice. By allowing twenty-nine photographs of weapons that
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 593.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 594.
See MO. REV. STAT. § 565.030.4 (2018).
Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 594 (Stith, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 576–77 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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were wholly unrelated to the charged crime, the court defies decades of
Missouri case law that has historically served as a safeguard for the rights of
criminal defendants.169 Missouri courts have continually held that when a
person is put on trial for a criminal charge, only evidence that is both logically
and legally relevant to that crime should be shown to the jury.170 Evidence is
logically relevant if it “tends to make the existence of a material fact more or
less probable.”171 Evidence is legally relevant only if its probative value
outweighs its costs.172 The rule in Missouri has historically been that trial
courts must conduct a balancing test with each piece of evidence: the
probative value of the evidence must be weighed against the evidence’s
prejudicial value, and if the prejudicial value substantially outweighs the
probative value, that evidence should be excluded in the interest of fairness
and justice.173
The only probative value of the twenty-nine photographs in this case was
that Wood’s possession of these firearms could potentially show that he
picked out the smallest, quietest gun.174 However, this argument fails on two
distinct grounds: first, it relies on inferences that are wholly unsupported by
the record, and second, it assumes the firearm photos were the only means of
proving deliberation.
The State’s argument that the photographs prove deliberation is wholly
inconsistent with the testimony as it was presented at trial.175 The State argues
that the photographs prove deliberation because Wood purposefully chose the
smallest of his firearms to commit the murder in an attempt to cover up his
crime.176 However, this argument is based on mere speculation, delving into
Wood’s mindset to say that he must have purposely passed up all of his other
firearms on his way to the murder weapon. Nowhere in the record do any of
the parties state that there is evidence of this deliberation. This argument also
infers that, if Wood purposely passed up his other firearms in favor of his .22,
he presumptively did so because it would be the quietest and easiest to cover
up. Without more evidence to tie this argument to what actually happened
leading up to Owens’s murder, the State’s argument fails by requiring such a
great leap of inference and blatant speculation.
As Judge Stith noted in her dissent, the State could have proven Wood’s
deliberation by mere testimony about the firearms that Wood kept in his

169. Id. at 591 (Stith, J., dissenting).
170. See, e.g., State v. Prince, 534 S.W.3d 813, 817–18 (Mo. 2017) (en banc);
State v. Anderson, 76 S.W.3d 275, 276 (Mo. 2002) (en banc).
171. Anderson, 716 S.W.3d at 276.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 689 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Mo. App. 1985); State v.
Charles, 572 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Mo. App. 1978); State v. Wynne, 182 S.W.2d 294,
300 (Mo. 1944).
174. Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 576, 592.
175. Id. at 573 (discussing the testimony presented at trial bolstering Wood’s
character).
176. Id. at 576.
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home.177 Additionally, the State could have proven the existence of other
possible guns by showing the jury a photo of one or two guns that Wood
passed up on his way to retrieve the .22-caliber rifle. Rather, the State chose
to show the jury twenty-nine photographs of the firearms and related
accessories because the prosecutor knew that the images would paint Wood
in a light that was favorable to the State.178
If the State’s sole motive in admitting the firearm photographs was to
prove Wood’s deliberation, the prosecutor could have elicited alternative
testimony to show that Wood deliberated before killing Owens. The State
could have relied merely on their argument that Wood’s deliberation was
evidenced by his placing his gun to Owens’ head and pulling the trigger.179
The State could have proven Wood’s deliberation through evidence of
Wood’s notebook by showing that Wood entertained fantasies of harming
young girls.180 The State could have proven Wood’s deliberation by
introducing text messages from Wood’s phone that show Wood discussed
“hunting” with his friends.181 If the State actually cared about proving
Wood’s deliberation, the prosecutor could have elicited testimony regarding
Wood’s coverup of his crime, as evidenced by his purchase and subsequent
use of bleach and plastic tubs.182 While the State argues that deliberation was
proven through these twenty-nine photographs of unrelated firearms, this
argument incorrectly presumes that Wood’s deliberation could not have been
shown through alternative, less prejudicial means.
What the defendant did in this case was deplorable. He killed an
innocent little girl, and the State was certainly correct to prosecute him
accordingly. Nevertheless, our legal system provides rules of evidence for a
reason. The rules of evidence ensure that every citizen is given a fair
opportunity to defend him or herself, regardless of how morally reprehensible
his or her conduct may be. While it may be easy to look at these rules
differently in cases where defendants deserve punishment for their actions,
that does not make it right. Courts cannot abandon the principles of justice
that our nation is built upon simply because it is convenient.
Because the prejudicial nature of this evidence so vastly outweighs any
probative evidence of deliberation, the Supreme Court of Missouri wrongly
decided Wood. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Missouri has set a
dangerous precedent that could allow prosecutors to ignore the previously
required balancing test and present prejudicial evidence with little regard for
justice.

177. Missouri courts have historically held that introduction of weapons or other
demonstrative evidence, especially when such evidence is unrelated to the charged
crime, unfairly prejudices jurors against the defendant more than mere testimony. See,
e.g., State v. Wynne, 182 S.W.2d 294, 288–289 (Mo. 1944).
178. Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 592–593 (Stith, J., dissenting).
179. Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 572.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 573 (majority opinion).
182. Id. at 572.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In State v. Wood, the Supreme Court of Missouri did not reverse the trial
court’s decision to admit twenty-nine photographs of firearms and related
accessories that were not involved in the disputed murder.183 The court’s
decision goes against the great weight of Missouri case precedent.184 As a
result, the court’s decision sets a new standard, allowing prosecutors to
disregard the rules of evidence prohibiting introduction of evidence with
probative value that is outweighed by its prejudicial value. This precedent
certainly damages those similarly situated to Wood, but it also casts a shadow
over the Missouri criminal justice system by allowing trial courts to utilize
unqualified discretion with potentially fatal consequences.

183. Id. at 577.
184. See, e.g., State v. Perry, 689 S.W.2d 123, 125 (Mo. App. 1985) (“The courts
of this state, with notable consistency, have recognized that weapons unconnected
with either the accused or the offense for which he is standing trial lack any probative
value and their admission into evidence is inherently prejudicial and constitutes
reversible error.”); State v. Charles, 572 S.W.2d 193, 198 (Mo. App. 1978) (“Lethal
weapons completely unrelated to and unconnected with the criminal offense for which
an accused is standing trial have a ring of prejudice seldom attached to other
demonstrative evidence, and the appellate courts of this state have been quick to brand
their admission into evidence, and any display of or reference to them during closing
argument, as prejudicial error.”); State v. Wynne, 182 S.W.2d 294, 300 (Mo. 1944)
(“The objection to the introduction of weapons or other demonstrative evidence,
especially when not connected with the defendant or his crime, on the ground of unfair
prejudice is based on sound psychological and philosophical principles.”).
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